


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Security-Aware Route Selection in DTNs Towards Optimal Key Provisioning

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Secure communication needs routes and keys

DELAY-TOLERANT NETWORK (DTN)

Store, carry, and forward through scheduled contacts



BUNDLE PROTOCOL SECURITY (BPsec)

Integrity and confidentiality

Key management: the operator



Which key scopes must be provisioned to meet a connectivity target?



Key scope

A key-sharing relationship between nodes or groups




Connectivity target

Fraction of ordered source-destination pairs with at least one usable route



Four security schemes

End-to-End (E2E)




Protection Span
Source to Destination



Data-at-Rest Exposure
Zero

Hop-by-Hop (HbH)




Protection Span
Adjacent topological links



Data-at-Rest Exposure
High

Edge-by-Edge (EbE)




Protection Span
Each domain boundary



Data-at-Rest Exposure
Medium

Edge-to-Edge (EtE)



Protection Span
Boundaries of source and destination domains





Data-at-Rest Exposure
Low

P. G. Madoery, R. Cherini, A. Cammarano, J. J. Grosso and J. M. Finochietto, "Analysis of Bundle Protocol Security Policies for Safeguarding Space Missions against Threats," 2023 IEEE International Conference on Wireless for Space and Extreme Environments (WiSEE), Aveiro, Portugal, 2023

P. G. Madoery, R. Cherini, A. Cammarano, J. Grosso and J. M. Finochietto, "Bundle Protocol Security Models and Policies for Safeguarding Space Information Networks," in *IEEE Journal of Radio Frequency Identification*, vol. 8, pp. 547-558, 2024





Routes, security schemes and keys: tightly coupled






Scheme	E2E	HbH	EbE	EtE
This route	1	9	7	3
Catalog	380	62	106	112

Route-aware key provisioning optimizer

1 INPUTS



2 DECISION VARIABLES



3 OBJECTIVE AND CONSTRAINTS



Objective function

$$\min \sum_{k \in K} z_k$$



Coverage target

$$\sum_{(s,d) \in D} x_{sd} \geq \lceil \gamma |D| \rceil$$



Pair-route consistency


$$\begin{aligned} y_p &\leq x_{sd} & \forall (s,d) \in D, \forall p \in P_{sd} \\ x_{sd} &\leq \sum_{p \in P_{sd}} y_p & \forall (s,d) \in D \end{aligned}$$



Route-key coupling

$$\sum_{k \in K(p)} z_k \geq |K(p)| y_p \quad \forall p \in P$$

Secure connectivity has more than one cost



Four-plane scenario



20 nodes
4 domains



64 contacts
2700 s



1134 Routes



380 ordered
pairs

Security policy becomes a quantitative choice



E2E · PROTECTION FIRST

Largest key set
Lowest exposure & processing



EDGE BASED · PRACTICAL MIDDLE

EtE: slightly more scopes
Lower exposure & fewer operations than EbE



HBH · KEY FOOTPRINT FIRST

Smallest active key set
Highest exposure & processing

FURTHER WORK

Larger multi-domain scenarios

Traffic-aware connectivity

Hybrid per-route policies

Key distribution scheduling



Thank you! Questions?

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